Nevada’s appellate courts closed January 2026 with three significant civil opinions, each clarifying a doctrinal boundary that has meaningful implications for litigants and insurers. Together, the decisions refine premises-liability standards, expand remedies available to excess insurers, and establish a formal framework for anonymous pleading in civil cases.

In Moore v. Primadonna, a trucker slipped and fell in the fueling island outside a truck stop. After discovery closed, the truck stop’s operator moved for summary judgment. It argued Moore lacked admissible evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defense “had actual or constructive notice of the spilled fuel.” Moore conceded that point in opposition. He, instead, argued notice was present via Nevada’s version of the mode-of-operation doctrine.

In 2012, FGA, Inc. v. Giglio noted “there is a modern trend toward modifying this traditional approach to premises liability to accommodate newer merchandising techniques, such as the shift that grocery stores have made from clerk-assisted to self-service operations.” When the store’s “chosen mode of operation makes it reasonably foreseeable that a dangerous condition will occur, a store owner could be held liable for injuries to an invitee if the plaintiff proves that the store owner failed to take all reasonable precautions necessary to protect invitees from these foreseeable dangerous conditions.”

The rationale underlying the mode-of-operation approach is that an owner of a self-service establishment has, as a cost-saving measure, chosen to have his customers perform tasks that were traditionally performed by employees. If a customer who is performing such a task negligently creates a hazardous condition, the owner is charged with the creation of this condition just as he would be charged with the responsibility for negligent acts of his employees because it was the owner’s choice of mode of operation that created the risk.

A plaintiff relying upon a mode-of-operation theory still must prove notice. Notice is proven if the plaintiff “establishes that an injury was attributable to a reasonably foreseeable dangerous condition on the owner’s premises that is related to the owner’s self-service mode of operation.”

Applied here, the truck stop argued Moore had not demonstrated that self-service fueling was a newer merchandising technique, nor did Moore demonstrate fueling was traditionally performed by employees. The district court agreed and entered summary judgment.

Nevada’s Court of Appeals reversed. It concluded the district court erred by reading Giglio as requiring “a plaintiff who is injured at a self-service establishment to show that customers were performing tasks that were ‘traditionally performed by employees’ or that the establishment’s self-service operation was a ‘newer merchandising technique….'” Moore concluded that language in Giglio was dicta. “But nothing in the Giglio decision can be read as suggesting that these policy principles somehow constitute additional elements that must be proven to support a premises-liability claim under the mode-of-operation approach.” The Court of Appeals argued its holding was consistent with Sprague.

On remand, the district court must determine “if Moore raised a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether his slip-and-fall injury was attributable to a reasonably foreseeable dangerous condition on Primadonna’s premises related to its self-service mode of operation.”

Moore could be read narrowly, clarifying only that these two elements are not required to prove a mode-of-operation theory. However, plaintiffs will presumably read the case broadly, nearly eliminating the notice requirement from a premises liability case. Nearly all stores are self-service. If a customer, for example, in the dairy aisle drops a jar of pasta sauce that he selected from another part of the store, is that related to the self-service mode of operation? If a customer selects a beverage from a cooler, begins consuming it before purchasing the item, and spills it, is that related to the self-service mode of operation? If a customer brings a drink into the store, carries it with her while shopping, and then spills it, is that related to the self-service mode of operation?

In North River Insurance v. James River Insurance, the Nevada Supreme Court resolved a question of first impression concerning whether an excess insurer may pursue equitable subrogation claims against a primary insurer for failure to settle within policy limits. In the underlying case, James River was the primary carrier and declined three opportunities to settle within its policy limits. The case settled before trial for an amount exceeding those limits, requiring North River, the excess carrier, to contribute. North River then sued James Rivers for equitable subrogation. A district court dismissed the complaint, meaning an excess insurer in North River’s position could not assert an equitable subrogation claim.

Nevada’s Supreme Court disagreed. “[A]n excess insurer may state a claim for equitable subrogation against a primary insurer when the insured would have suffered loss absent the excess insurer’s discharge of the liability, regardless of whether the suit settled within the combined policy limits of the insurers.” “[A]n excess insurer that pays toward a settlement against its insured may pursue reimbursement from the primary insurer for the primary insurer’s failure to accept a reasonable settlement offer within the primary insurer’s policy limits.”

The decision brings Nevada in line with jurisdictions recognizing that primary insurers’ settlement decisions can have direct financial consequences for excess carriers—and that equitable subrogation provides a mechanism to police unreasonable settlement conduct.

Finally, in Burns v. Dist. Ct., the Nevada Supreme Court created a legal framework through which civil litigants can proceed anonymously in certain circumstances. Burns arose from a civil case alleging sexual assault. The plaintiff filed using a pseudonym. Burns challenged the plaintiff’s ability to file under the pseudonym.

Nevada’s Supreme Court recognized the conflicting interests between “the fundamental presumption of open proceedings and the countervailing necessity of protecting parties from harm that could chill access to the courts.” After surveying the approaches used in various federal circuits, the court adopted a standard for Nevada that aligns with the Ninth Circuit, in part. “[A] party may proceed pseudonymously when that party’s need for anonymity outweighs prejudice to the opposing party and the public’s interest in knowing the party’s identity.” Burns then articulated a four-part, non-exhaustive list of factors to balance: (1) “the severity of the threatened harm; (2) the reasonableness of the anonymous party’s fears; (3) the anonymous party’s vulnerability to such retaliation; (4) the prejudice to the opposing party; and (5) the public interest.” Applying those factors, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the plaintiff to proceed anonymously.

The decision also establishes a procedural mechanism for future cases with plaintiffs seeking to proceed pseudonymously. “Essentially, a party seeking to proceed anonymously must file their initial complaint or petition conditionally under a pseudonym and then move for an order granting permission to proceed pseudonymously, at which time the court should apply the above standard in determining whether to grant the requested relief.” However, that may all proceed before a defendant is even served. Notably, the court did not address whether or how a defendant who later appears may challenge an order granting pseudonymous status, leaving that issue for future litigation.